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Abstract
Gaining a comprehensive understanding and overview of
new musical technologies is fraught with difﬁculties. They
are made of digital materials of such diverse origins and
nature, that they do not ﬁt comfortably into traditional
organological classiﬁcations. This article traces the history
of musical instrument classiﬁcations relevant to the under-
standing of new digital instruments, and proposes an alter-
native method to the centuries-old tree-structure of
downwards divisions. The proposed musical organics is a
multidimensional, heterarchical, and organic approach to
the analysis and classiﬁcation of both traditional and new
musical instruments that suits the rhizomatic nature of their
material design and technical origins. Outlines of a hypo-
thetical organological informatics retrieval system are also
presented.
Keywords: organology, classiﬁcation, musical instruments,
NIME, musical organics, information retrieval
1. Introduction
Since the beginning of recorded history, we ﬁnd technolo-
gies of music-making at the forefront of human technics; as
artefacts, musical instruments can be seen as an individual
culture’s ‘crowning achievements’ (Nettl, 2005, p. 382).
The expertise required to build instruments such as lutes,
ﬂutes, organs or pianos, traditionally placed music tech-
nologies at the cusp of human ingenuity and technical
knowledge. With the advent of electricity, the evolution of
musical instruments has developed alongside technological
progress and scientiﬁc knowledge. These changes have
been connected to developments in musical culture, equally
in terms of new performance technologies, aesthetics,
music theory, social practices, and architectural spaces. A
profound technological shift took place with the advent of
electronic instruments in the late nineteenth century; gain-
ing a stronger cultural resonance in the latter half of the
twentieth century, equally in modern, contemporary, and
popular musics. The history the analogue synthesizer’s
innovation, in the 1960s, is a good example of the complex
process of adoption required for new music technologies to
become stabilised as instruments among other instruments
(Pinch & Trocco, 2002). Furthermore, the commercialisa-
tion of digital music technologies in the 1970s, a new wave
of energy and innovation transformed the ﬁeld of musical
instruments. Often referred to as digital musical instruments
(DMIs), these new music technologies are part of an indus-
try that is exceptionally dynamic and fast changing, and
their development should be seen in conjunction with an
interdisciplinary research ﬁeld called ‘NIME’ (New Inter-
faces for Musical Expression—see www.nime.org). Here,
new musical instruments are studied from the perspectives
of music, performance, ergonomics, psychology, engineer-
ing, software design, digital signal processing, and more.
New controllers, sensors, mapping techniques, feedback
actuators, motors, machine learning, and digital signal pro-
cessing techniques are continually applied in devices of
emergent research, some of which reach the commercial
marketplace through a convoluted process of innovation
and marketing.
In the current rapidly developing era of computation,
musical instruments are designed using the latest technolo-
gies, both in terms of software and hardware. The ﬁeld is
continually reticulating, branching, but also clustering
around technologies that ﬁnd resonance in musical practice.
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We observe how the evolution of a particular instrument
tends to halt at a certain point; it becomes a node in which
the technology concretisises (Simondon, 2016), and
becomes a stable reference for composers, performers, edu-
cational institutions, as well as the media and the general
public. New instruments are thus either pulled into tradi-
tion, repertoire, and educational establishments, or rejected,
put on hold, forgotten. Instruments that become part of
musical tradition develop slowly, and change is of minute
degree, rarely of essence. An unarticulated contract is
forged between composers, performers, and instrument
makers, constituting their complex and multidimensional
relationship. In order to understand these relationships and
how the evolution of an instrument stabilises, we might
apply actor–network theory (Latour, 2005), and examine
how each of the roles is part of more integrated networks:
institutional, educational, cultural, aesthetic, commercial,
and technological. The composer–interpreter–instrument
maker triangle is part of a complex hierarchy and power
structure that, from the lens of musical instruments,
involves educational institutions, guilds, societies, associa-
tions, publishers and labels, manufacturers, collections,
concert halls, festivals, the media, and commercial retailers.
New digital instruments destabilise these structures and
form new economic constellations, vocations, and
professions.
There is a clear demand for establishing organisational
principles for these new digital instruments. Inventors want
to learn from each other (McPherson et al., 2016; Paine,
2010), performers beneﬁt from a stronger contextualisation
of their musical practice, musicologists need a terminology
to analyse and reference developments in the ﬁeld, and
composers wish to understand the instrumentation princi-
ples of these new technologies. Critical analytics of DMIs
can be helpful to all of the above. The research ﬁeld that
has traditionally dealt with the study and classiﬁcation of
musical instruments is called organology. Organologists
have presented a plethora of useful approaches to classify-
ing and sorting musical instruments, equally for compre-
hensive musicological knowledge, and for the spatial
considerations of outlining a book about instruments, or
organising a museum’s instrument collection. The organisa-
tional principles are many and they differ amongst the
world’s cultures, often focusing on the material substrata of
instruments and their vibrational function. Originating in
the classical Indian Nāṭyaśāstra system, the museum classi-
ﬁcation of Mahillon in 1880, and the system designed by
Hornbostel and Sachs in 1914, we now typically operate
with classiﬁcatory divisions deﬁned as idiophones, mem-
branophones, chordophones, and aerophones.
The above-mentioned Hornbostel–Sachs system (1914)
is the most universally accepted classiﬁcation scheme, and,
albeit imperfect, it is widely used in musicological litera-
ture, as well as in museum collections. In 1940, Sachs
introduced the electrophone category as a response to new
musical materialities, such as oscillators, ﬁlters, pickups,
and ampliﬁers (Sachs, 2006). The electrophone category
has proved insufﬁcient for today’s context, and a number
of authors have engaged with the issue, as we will see
later. However, the problem is extremely complex as the
ﬁeld of new electronic instruments has dramatically
increased in size, activities, and technological solutions
since the 1940s, both in the analogue and digital domains.
Because of disperse origins, digital music technologies can-
not easily be made a subset of the electrophone, nor would
a category such as the digiphone really work—and we will
explore that problem in this article.1 The difﬁculty we are
faced with is illustrated by the following question: what
constitutes the organisational principles of digital instru-
ments? We are surely not only interested in their physical
materiality, as the plastic, rubber or metal they are made of
do not produce the sound they emit.2 Instead, we discover
organisational principles relating to the type of sound-
producing algorithms, performer gestures, perception-
modalities of sensors, or mapping strategies, to name but a
few. The frameworks we apply to understand instrumental
qualities from these principles form a critical analytics of
musical instruments, and the musical organics system
described in the last section of this article supports such
multi-perspective analytics.
The difﬁculty in attempting to continue the classiﬁca-
tory strategies of the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies for the new material reality of digital musical
technologies is evident. For this reason, much of the work
attempting to add digital instruments to existing organologi-
cal classiﬁcations include the word ‘towards’ in the title, as
the authors typically acknowledge that these are only the
ﬁrst steps towards a new or improved organology. But the
journey often ends there. The intention is not to poke fun
at what might appear to be half-ﬁnished jobs, but rather
acknowledge the useful attempts and ingenious solutions
proposed. These frameworks can serve as analytic tools
even if the aim of comprehensiveness is abandoned. How-
ever, in this article I hope to admit defeat even before writ-
ing the word ‘towards’ (no matter how tempting), and an
1Further additions to the ﬁvefold classiﬁcations have been
common: Olsen (1980) introduced the corpophone in 1980 for
instruments that are part of the human body; Mann’s (2007) phy-
sics-based organology adding physiphones (divided into subcate-
gories, such as hydraulophones and plasmaphones); or indeed
Deirdre Loughridge and Thomas Patteson’s ﬁctophones (see
https://imaginaryinstruments.org), referencing musical instruments
that never sounded but exist as ideas (ideophone would suit that,
if it wasn’t too similar to idiophone).
2Although from an HCI perspective—which would form part of
the aforementioned digiphone studies—this might indeed be of
great importance, as the choice between plastic, rubber or metal is
likely to yield different musical results, for example in the differ-
ence in psychological and cultural response towards these distinct
materials. This is an area explored by the Owl Project (www.owl
project.com), who have built digital instruments out of wood for
nearly two decades.
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alternative strategy to tackle the problem is presented: that
of musical organics.
This article brieﬂy surveys key historical classiﬁcations
in organology, before introducing more recent attempts to
deal with comprehensive classiﬁcations of digital instru-
ments. The notion of musical organics is then proposed as
an approach beneﬁting the organology of new digital
instruments. This is not a classiﬁcation system designed
with considerations of physical space or printed books: it is
rather a philosophical concept, engaging with the problems
of classifying DMIs, and proposing a dynamic architectural
information-space applying modern media technologies,
where classiﬁcations of musical instruments can be built
on-the-ﬂy using a ﬂexible information retrieval system.
2. Classifying instruments
All musical cultures have ways of understanding their
instruments that involve sorting them into meaningful cate-
gories. What could be considered a useful classiﬁcation in
one culture might be of little relevance in another, and we
often ﬁnd that extra-instrumental concerns, such as mythol-
ogy, societal structure, cosmology, or religious function
play part in deﬁning the principles of categorisation. Kar-
tomi (1990) has written a ﬁne ethnomusicological account
of organological classiﬁcation schemes across distinct musi-
cal cultures. Kvifte (2005) continues this work and reas-
sesses the problems of organology in the electronic age,
emphasising the analysis of playing technique, but with a
reference to the evolution of organological classiﬁcation
schemes. Most often these schemes focus on the material
substance and morphology of the instruments, for example
in the Sanskrit Nāṭyaśāstra, written between 200 BCE and
200 CE, where instruments are grouped into the categories
of ‘stretched’ (e.g. the vina string instrument); ‘covered’
(e.g. drums); ‘hollow’ (e.g. ﬂutes); and ‘solid’ (e.g. bells
and cymbals). This is a coherent system—unlike the com-
mon division used in Western orchestral instrumentation
into string, wind, brass and percussion sections (where
string refers to the vibrational material, wind to the excita-
tion force, brass to the material type and percussion to the
human action)—and it is the inspiration for Mahillon’s
classiﬁcation introduced below, and thus various systems
still in use today, for example the Hornbostel–Sachs.
Western organology also traces its origins back to Hel-
lenic thought, where both Plato and Aristotle talk about
animate instruments (organon psychon or the human voice)
and inanimate instruments (organon apsychon or string and
wind instruments). Both had a strong preference for the
human vocal instrument (with Plato effectively banning
inanimate instruments from his ideal city-state), and this is
a view that persisted for centuries to come (Kartomi, 1990,
p. 108). A more systematic classiﬁcation, which prevailed
throughout the medieval period, was presented by the
Neoplatonic philosopher Porphyry, in the third century CE,
but he is known for the explication of Aristotle’s
Categories into a classiﬁcatory tree structure called Arbor
Porphyriana (the Porphyrian Tree). In his work on organol-
ogy, Porphyry divided musical instruments into three cate-
gories: wind, string and percussion. This system was often
combined with cosmological and theological explanations
of music, such as Boethius’s sixth century division into mu-
sica mundana, musica humana and musica instrumentalis
(as the third category was later called), a classiﬁcation later
adopted by Athanasius Kircher, whose Musurgia
Universalis from 1650 became a key musicological treatise,
inﬂuencing composers such as Bach and Beethoven
(Devlin, 2002).
In the Renaissance, the focus shifted from the cosmos
back to human musicians and their instruments. Indeed,
Kircher based his work on the writings of Gioseffo Zarlino,
a sixteenth century composer, instrument maker, and musi-
cologist, who designed an inﬂuential and comprehensive
classiﬁcatory scheme built upon Porphyry’s system. Zarlino
divided instruments into natural and artiﬁcial categories,
depending upon whether they related to the movement of
the heavenly bodies or not, but also into instromenti mobili
(for variable pitches, such as violin or trombone) or instro-
menti stabili (for ﬁxed pitches, such as harp or a ﬂute).
However, it was with the work of Michael Praetorius, in
1619, that we ﬁnd the ﬁrst modern systematic organologi-
cal approach, in his work De Organographia, dedicated to
musicians and instrument makers (Restle, 2008, p. 259).
Praetorius’s book was beautifully illustrated, and in it we
ﬁnd instruments divided into wind, strings, and percussion.
The book was very inﬂuential with composers and per-
formers and its popularity was not superseded until Berlioz
published his manual of instrumentation in 1855 (see
Figure 1).
Between 1880 and 1892, Victor-Charles Mahillon, a
curator at the Musée instrumental du Conservatoire Royale
de Musique in Brussels, published a ﬁve-volume catalogue
of musical instruments. The preface of the ﬁrst volume was
called Essai de classiﬁcation méthodique de tous les instru-
mentes anciens et modernes (Mahillon, 1880), and here
Mahillon developed a scheme of coherent organisational
principles that would work for the museum’s large collec-
tion of instruments. The scheme was a tree-branch division-
ary system, divided into the classes of autophones,
mebranophones, chordophones, and aerophones. In addi-
tion to the period’s imperialism and the acquisition of cul-
tural items from across the globe, at play was also
nineteenth century scientism, exempliﬁed by the work of
Comte, Darwin, Marx, Freud, Grimm and von Humboldt,
where methods of collecting, measuring, describing, analys-
ing and classifying were vigorously applied in the study
of cultural change and natural evolution, both central con-
cepts of the nineteenth century scientiﬁc practices. The use
of scientiﬁc instruments, as epistemic tools for thinking
about the world, also affected the musical thinking of the
time, and technologies such as chronometers, tuning forks,
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sirens and metronomes provided a new platform for the
development of compositional approaches (Jackson, 2011).
Building on Mahillon’s system, the classiﬁcation
designed by Erich M. von Hornbostel and Curt Sachs in
1914 has been the most popular scheme for categorising
musical instruments in the twentieth century. Redeﬁning
some of the taxonomical divisions, and also introducing logi-
cal numbering based on the Dewey Decimal System (known
to most people as the system used for classifying books in
library collections), Hornbostel and Sachs were under no
illusion that their classiﬁcatory system would be coherent
and logical at all times, stating that the ‘objects to be classi-
ﬁed are alive and dynamic, indifferent to sharp demarcation
and set form, while systems are static and depend upon shar-
ply-drawn demarcations and categories’ (von Hornbostel &
Sachs, 1961, p. 4). The system enables a tracing down to the
unique features of individual instruments, through logical
divisions at each hierarchical level. For example, the numeri-
cal denominator of 111.242.222 would refer to sets of hang-
ing bells with internal strikers (1 = idiophone; 11 = struck
idiophone; 111 = idiophones struck directly; 111.2 = percus-
sion idiophones; 111.24 = percussion vessels;
111.242 = bells; 111.242.2 = sets of bells; 111.242.22 = sets
of suspended bells; 111.242.222 = sets of clapper bells). A
system with such nuanced cataloguing is clearly beneﬁcial
for museums, historians, anthropologists, and musicologists,
but it might not reﬂect the reality of actual musical practice
(see Figure 2).
Sachs’ ﬁfth category, the aforementioned electrophones
introduced in 1940, was divided into instruments with elec-
tronic action (51), electromechanical action (52), and elec-
troacoustic action (53). This addition was sufﬁcient
plasterwork at the time, but with digital instruments, soft-
ware and diverse mappable controllers, this ﬁx has long
crumbled under the weight of new innovations. In their
article ‘Demystifying and Classifying Electronic Music
Instruments’, Bakan, Bryant, Li, Martinelli, and Vaughn
(1990) address the problems of Hornbostel and Sachs’
four-branched organology by proposing a considerable
addition to the system. Not persuaded by Sach’s deﬁnition
of the electrophone category, they suggest a rethinking
where electric and ampliﬁed instruments are sent back to
their acoustic siblings (where the electric guitar becomes a
subcategory of the chordophone guitar, but with an added
‘E’ at the end, or: 321.322-E). In this system, the electro-
phone category is used exclusively for instruments that
generate sounds electronically. For example, the famous
Yamaha DX7 digital FM synthesizer gets the classiﬁcation
of 512.231 K-Ps/Ua-My-T-MIDI.3
Margaret Birley and Arnold Myers (Birley & Myers,
2015) have recently published a revision of the
Hornbostel–Sachs classiﬁcation, which has now been taken
into use by the MIMO (Musical Instruments Museums
Online) consortium. Considering that the Hornbostel–Sachs
system is widely used internationally, this is a welcome
and timely project, updating the system to be more
inclusive of non-Western instruments, and in particular,
Fig. 1. A woodcut from Praetorius’ De Organographia, a key
organological work published in 1619.
Fig. 2. A common tree-like organological classiﬁcation. Here,
showing the top categories of the Hornbostel–Sachs Systematik
from 1916.
3Certain problems appear in this system with devices such as
sequencers or ﬁlters that do not actually generate sounds but are
essential to many electrophone productions. These are called
‘modiﬁers’.
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expanding the electrophone category. The MIMO website
is already an impressive resource for musical instruments
(see www.mimo-international.com). However, from the per-
spective of someone embedded in the ﬁeld of NIME
research, the electrophone category is still very limited and
needs further work. The weakness of the category relates to
the unorthodox status of electronic instruments, which—in
particular new DMIs or NIMEs—have a history of existing
outside the inscribed musical tradition (for reasons too
complex to be dealt with here), illustrated by the fact that
they do not tend to be awarded much space or presence in
museum collections of musical instruments.
Another recent attempt to attend to the problems of the
Hornbostel–Sachs system can be found in a recent paper
by Weisser and Quanten (2011), who provide two alter-
ations to the system, the ﬁrst introducing two versions of
timbre modiﬁers as important organological concerns, the
second adding a modular syntax to the electrophone cate-
gory (represented by symbols such as +, *, and =). This
addition to the electrophone class was by request of the
MIMO team. The article criticises Bakan et al.’s (1990)
sweeping generalisations, and proposes a more modular
approach that represents the complexity of twenty-ﬁrst cen-
tury instruments. In the ﬁnal section of the paper the
authors come to the conclusion that perhaps downwards
macrotaxonomies might not be ideal for the complexity we
are currently faced with, considering also that any ‘classiﬁ-
cation system reﬂects its inventor’s ideas about the objects
of his or her research as much as—if not more than—the
way the inventor organizes the objects’. (Weisser & Quan-
ten, 2011, p. 140). In the last section of the article, Quanten
speculates whether we could devise a framework with more
holistic approaches, moving away from tree-like classiﬁca-
tions.
3. Trees grow upwards: On typologies and
microtaxonomies
The organological classiﬁcations described in the previous
section are all characterised by their downwards logical
divisions. This organisational approach is comprehensive,
with the primary function of addressing the spatial consid-
erations of ﬁtting a large amount of data or material objects
into their respective locations. However, other classiﬁca-
tions are not necessarily so concerned with this overall per-
spective, suggesting a bottom-up approach where the
unique instrument is described in detail and seen in the
context of its musical culture. In 1947, Hans Heinz Dräger
developed a method of microtaxonomical organology—de-
tailed inspection and description of instruments—added as
‘clusters of variables’ to the end nodes found in the Horn-
bostel–Sachs scheme. Also including the electrophone cate-
gory, Dräger’s parameter clusters focused on the
instrument’s: (a) appearance, (b) tone production, (c) mono-
and polyphonic capacity, (d) musical ﬂexibility, (e) tone
duration, dynamic range and loudness, (f) range, melodic
possibilities, (g) tone colour range, (h) tone colour, (i) the
performer (Dräger, 1948). The system has been criticised
for being too complex (Kunst, 1959, p. 61) and is not in
wide use, although clusters as parameter spaces have been
applied to some degree in the NIME literature, as we will
see later (e.g. Birnbaum, Fiebrink, Malloch, & Wanderley,
2005; Magnusson, 2010; Spiegel, 1992).
In 1969, Elschek and Stockman published a paper on
an upward typology of musical instruments (Elschek &
Stockman, 1969). They suggest a distinction between a
classiﬁcation and a typology, where classiﬁcation is seen as
downwards, based on a single criterion for division,
whereas typology is upwards, focusing on the whole instru-
ment, and subsequently grouping it with other instruments
of similar nature. For Elschek and Stockman organology is
primarily an empirical study with a strong historical ele-
ment, as opposed to the more distant logical systematics.
Elschek also developed a graphical system of signs for
describing the instrumental functionality of aerophones
(Elschek, 1969). With a grounded focus on the characteris-
tics of the instrument itself, Elschek’s approach was to cre-
ate a language, both conceptual and symbolic, to describe
and explain the unique functionality of the instruments.
The idea of using graphical means to describe instruments
is further explored by Mantle Hood, who, in 1971, came
up with a system called organography. The organograms
were inspired by choreographic Labanotation (Laban,
1975), and are a method of describing the key element of
the instrument. The collection of organograms illustrate
symbolically the lowest terminal entries of the Hornbostel–
Sachs scheme and are a useful contribution to organologi-
cal science, although they have been criticised for being
difﬁcult to learn and laborious to prepare (Kartomi, 1990,
p. 186) (see Figure 3).
Fig. 3. Mantle Hood’s organography enabled a visual description
of musical instruments in their functional details. Here, displaying
a composite symbol for a pair of ﬁctitious drums.
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In the work of Heyde (1975), an emphasis is placed on
the evolution and relationships between instruments, con-
ceptualised via analysis he deﬁned as a ‘natural system of
classiﬁcation’ inspired by genetics. This is a complex sys-
tem, but involves classes of abstraction levels, for example,
the ‘formal class’, where he distinguishes between techno-
logical and human elements in instruments using the terms
of technomorph and anthropomorph. Here, prototypical
instruments are only anthropomorphic, as in whistling or
beat boxing; typical instruments are both technomorphic
and anthropomorphic, such as the piano and the saxophone;
and exotypic instruments have only technomorphic quali-
ties, as in musical automata and some software. An inter-
esting feature of Heyde’s system is the ‘system class’
wherein he describes the functional elements of instru-
ments, dividing their ‘carrier elements’ into: initiator, inter-
mediary, transformer, intermediate transformer, modulator,
ampliﬁer, resonator, and coupler (Kvifte, 2005, p. 46).
Recent studies in organology broaden the scope of the
ﬁeld, often emphasising the cultural context of musical
instruments (Dawe, 2001; Qureshi, 2000); lived organology
based on stories, historical meanings and relationship with
the sacred (Hooshmandrad, 2004); or the ‘social life’ of
musical instruments (Bates, 2012). Bates applies actor–net-
work theory in analysing how instruments are more than
simple objects applied in music making, but actually serve
as complex actor-networks of meaning, history, and agency.
A related approach is taken by Tresch and Dolan (2013) in
their ‘Toward a New Organology: Instruments of Music
and Science’, where they apply the same type of
organological classiﬁcation to both scientiﬁc and musical
instruments—one based on ethics. Building their system on
the later work of Foucault, they propose the following cate-
gories for instrumental ethics: (1) material disposition, or
what kind of assemblage the instrument is; (2) mode of
mediation, or how the instrument’s action is seen as auton-
omous or passive, modifying or transparent, hidden or visi-
ble; (3) map of mediations, or musical context, material
conditions, protocols and institutions; (4) the instrument’s
telos, or its ends. Here they ask: what is the meaning of
the instrument? Why is it used? How does it impact on its
context? Like Bates, Tresch and Dolan apply actor–network
theory when describing how ethical concepts can be
applied to inanimate objects.
Other systems include Kurt Reinhard’s structured
approach to analysing the stylistic properties of instru-
ments. Reinhart found the Hornbostel–Sachs system sufﬁ-
cient for classifying the morphology of musical
instruments, but presented a system that added concerns of
note production (whether mono- or polyphonic, whether
the notes are continuous or die away, and whether the notes
can be dynamically changed during play). Playability and
context was important for Reinhard and he suggested that
loudness and timbre should also be graded in the analysis
of instruments. It is also relevant to mention here two pro-
jects developed in the early 1970s, which used computers
for database entries, by Michael Ramey and William Malm,
respectively. For both Ramey and Malm, the use of rela-
tional databases would extend the Hornbostel–Sachs system
with diverse additional classiﬁcations, such as ornamenta-
tion, vibration sources, timbre, tuning data, cultural func-
tions, and performer behaviour. Malm’s system entailed an
open database for entering additional categories, and, inter-
estingly, one of Malm’s primary database entries were holo-
gram ﬁles of the instruments. This is relevant in today’s
context of new virtual reality technologies, where 3D repre-
sentations of instruments can be rendered—and easily
recorded with holographic capturing software that works on
regular cameras, for example on mobile phones. At the
time, in the early 1970s, Ramey’s system was visionary in
that it understood the information storage and retrieval
potential of computer use. He claimed that the system
could implement Dräger’s detailed classiﬁcation, but also
‘extend the boundaries of such classiﬁcation to encompass
any criteria which the researcher might ﬁnd useful’.
(Ramey quoted in Kartomi, 1990, p. 186).
Finally, to add yet another novel non-hierarchical
approach to these upwards classiﬁcations, the multidimen-
sional scalogram analysis proposed by Lysloff and Matson
(1985), forms an interesting alternative to traditional tree-
based classiﬁcations. Lysloff and Matson reject the logic of
hierarchical taxonomies and propose a structured system of
variables with which instruments can be analysed, and sub-
sequently visualised using graphical scalogram analysis,
where instruments are represented as points in 3D parame-
ter space that changes depending on which parameters are
studied. This visual representation is sufﬁciently under-
standable on printed paper, but could become extremely
interesting in a dynamic virtual reality system where the
representation could morph between parameter conﬁgura-
tions, with appropriate haptic interfaces for navigation.
4. New classiﬁcations for NIMEs
The dynamic research ﬁeld known as New Interfaces for
Musical Expression (NIME) is one of the key contexts for
the research and development of new musical instruments
and related technologies.4 The design of digital instruments
is clearly very different from the production of acoustic
instruments, due to the heightened epistemic dimension
inscribed in the materialities of digital systems (Magnus-
son, 2009). These new materialities are often hardware and
software technologies manufactured for purposes other than
music, but appropriated for nimes. Without a tradition
4NIME was originally the name of a workshop held at the CHI
conference in 2001 on the design of new interfaces for musical
expression, but it became an independent conference the year
after. There are now university courses called NIME, club events
with the title, and people often refer to new musical instruments
as ‘nimes’. (See www.nime.org).
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or the established composer–performer–instrument maker
constellation, new DMIs do indeed follow the innovation
and speed of high-tech culture, as opposed to the slower
development of acoustic instruments, engendering a sense
of novelty, curiosity, but also a certain alienation experi-
enced by performers and audience alike.
Examples of the new materialities of digital instruments
include: accelerometers that measure gestural movements in
three dimensions; photocells that sense luminosity; infrared
sensors detecting heat; face detection algorithms that can
perceive facial expressions; 3D motion-sensing range cam-
eras designed for computer games tracking whole-body
movements; biosensors perceiving bodily states and brain
interfaces tracking cognitive activity; and satellites tracking
geographic locations. Haptic feedback in instruments is
implemented with motors or solenoids. These materials
appear as nodes with a clear agency as they are interwoven
into complex techno-cultural structures.5 They are often
borrowed from clearly deﬁned utilisation contexts, such as
the use of thumbsticks and pads in gamepad controllers;
the accelerometer functionality of a Wii controller; the 3D
camera of the Kinect; printed circuit board technologies;
the medical context of electromyographic and brain inter-
faces; or the telecommunication and military context of
TCP/IP and GPS. In all of these cases the knowledge in
design and use of materials does not derive from the ﬁeld
of instrument design, but rather appropriated from other
technological domains.
The above are examples of material instances applied
in new musical instruments. Although obvious, it has to be
noted that the computer itself is not a musical instrument
but a meta-technology that has been adopted for such use.
As such, much of the technical expertise of the digital
luthier (Jordà, 2005) is not related to the acoustic properties
of materials, but rather factors of human–machine ergo-
nomics. A new type of knowledge is required to build, test,
perform, analyse and understand these new instruments; a
knowledge that does not derive from the age-old tradition
of making acoustic instruments. In lieu of the traditional
luthier’s oral transmission of knowledge—which includes
maintaining a relationship with composers and performers,
as well as an intuitive understanding of physical materials
and the acoustics of architectural performance spaces—the
digital luthier applies knowledge and techniques deriving
from product design, human–computer interaction, com-
puter games, web design, ergonomics, science ﬁction and
even virtuosic sports such as skateboarding or karate. Fur-
thermore, the programming languages used (say C, C++,
Lisp, Java, JavaScript) are not made for musical purposes,
although higher level musical environments have been
created using these. Similarly, the communication protocols
used, such as serial, TCP/IP, USB, HID, and more, are
adopted for speciﬁc uses and built upon (MIDI, for exam-
ple uses the serial protocol and OSC uses both TCP/IP and
UDP/IP). Finally, we could mention software libraries, such
as neural networks, machine learning, computer vision,
motion tracking, dynamic mapping, GUI frameworks (slid-
ers, buttons, knobs), etc., that are applied as blackboxes
(Latour, 1994) into the design of music software and hard-
ware instruments.
It is evident that the complexity of the new materials,
the heterogeneous knowledge required, and the nature of
the materials applied from extra-musical ﬁelds render the
situation of the digital luthier quite unique. The fact that
DMIs are not made of materials that resonate, and that
learning to play them involves understanding how human
gestures can be mapped to sound, points to the limitations
of traditional organological classiﬁcations. The instruments,
the design concerns, the performance contexts, and the
sound generation, are simply too heterogeneous to ﬁt the
existing classiﬁcation schemes. People have therefore
sought to redeﬁne what a musical instrument really is, how
the concept of instrumentality is transformed with the digi-
tal, and how we might attempt to group and classify the
new instruments. In his book ‘Instruments and the elec-
tronic age’ (2005), Tellef Kvifte, by emphasising analysis
of playing technique over instruments, shifts the meaning
of the term organology from instrumental organs to human
organs, nodding towards the turn to the body in the social
science, arts, and humanities research.6
In a paper asking what constitutes instrumentality in
new digital musical devices, Cance, Genevois, and Dubois
(2009) ask what classiﬁes instrument as such? They apply
cognitive linguistic research and discourse analysis to the
ﬁeld, analysing both English and French language use
related to new instruments, and conclude that instruments
are not deﬁned as being hardware devices or software, but
rather qualify as such as a consequence of how users inter-
act with them. Sarah Hardjowirogo (2017) further explores
the construction of instrumental identity, presenting seven
potential criteria for an object to classiﬁed as a musical
instrument: (1) Sound production, (2) intention/purpose, (3)
Learnability/virtuosity, (4) Playability/control/immediacy/
agency/interaction, (5) Expressivity/effort/corporeality, (6)
‘immaterial features’/Cultural Embeddedness, (7) Audience
perception/liveness. She points to the cultural embeddedness
5This type of analysis of technological interdependence can be
found in various work in the philosophy of technology, for exam-
ple expressed by Heidegger’s totality of equipment, Simondon’s
technical system, Latour’s actor-networks, Deleuze and Guattari’s
machinic assemblages, or Hui’s milieu of digital objects.
6We note, of course, the etymology of the words ‘organ’
(Gr. órganon) for instrument, implement, or that with which one
works (Gr. ergon), referencing both physical organs as well as
instruments. With biosensor technologies we might also question
the separation between biological organs and technological organs
(cf. discussion of Stiegler’s organology later in this article), where
in some cases musical instruments involves the synthesis of both,
for example in a brain-sensor musical instrument, where brain sig-
nals are translated to musical sound, without corporeal gestures. .
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of musical instruments, gesticulating towards a strand in
ethnomusicological research ranging from Johnson’s (1995)
focus on the form, function and meaning of instruments,
arguing for a wider scope in instrumental research, to Bates
(2012) application of actor–network theory to the discussion
of the social life of musical instruments.
Other organological attempts have pointed to instru-
ments as compositional devices, pointing to the machines
we use to create our music with, for example in Douglas
Kahn’s article ‘Track Organology’, where he states that our
instruments are ‘currently pitched for composition, writing,
and accumulation, not for performance, speech, and impro-
visation. They are laggard and methodological like a pen,
not fast and ﬁrst-draft like a tongue’ (Kahn, 1990, p. 74).
Considering the age of Kahn’s article, this is an under-
standable notion, as most digital music technologies at the
time were studio simulators, not instruments for live perfor-
mance. This has changed, and in a more recent work Kim
and Seifert (2017) argue for a classiﬁcation that would
include analysing the degree of interactivity and agency in
new instruments, and they present a taxonomy of interac-
tivity, depending on how autonomous the agency of the
instrument is. Similarly, Zénouda (2012) presents an
organology aimed at audio games, introducing a typology
based on what kind of musical control the player has (and
note the similarities in playing a game and playing an
instrument, if indeed there should be a distinction).
The critical analytics of musical instruments are multi-
perspective. For example, Levitin, McAdams, and Adams
(2002) provide an organological analysis of control parame-
ters in new musical instruments. Their approach focuses on
the sound itself, on classifying the segments of a single
musical note (or event), in order to provide a language that
can help in the design of new controllers. Jordà (2005), in
turn, introduces criteria such as playability, progression,
and learnability. This relates to how diverse output instru-
ments can have, and their identity. Is the instrument good
for improvisation? Is it expressive? Can it be easily con-
trolled and allow for virtuosic playing? In a NIME paper
published the same year, Birnbaum et al. (2005) introduce
a visual representation of a dimension space of digital
musical devices. Their approach is phenomenological; it
focuses primarily on the performer’s body and what the
instrument can offer in the performance context. Their cate-
gories are: required expertise, musical control, feedback
modalities, degrees of freedom, inter-actors, distribution in
space, and role of sound. These are set up in a sevenfold
visual dimension-space that enables us to compare instru-
ments via simple graphs. Having worked on a theory of
musical instruments as epistemic tools (Magnusson, 2009),
I found Birnbaum et al.’s system to be lacking the epis-
temic dimensions that allow us to analyse the conceptual
and music-theoretical content of musical instruments. My
response was published in a NIME paper (Magnusson,
2010) that analyses how musical instruments are inscribed
with knowledge, how theory is encapsulated in their
design, and how users engage with this embedded theory.
The categories in the epistemic dimension space were:
expressive constraints, autonomy, music theory, explorabil-
ity, required foreknowledge, improvisation, generality, and
creative-simulation. The paper used the same visual repre-
sentation as Birnbaum et al., primarily as it was meant to
be complimentary to their work. In both Birnbaum et al.
and in my own work, there are statements to the effect that
the systems presented are neither ﬁnal nor exhaustive.7 (see
Figure 4).
In a 2006 NIME paper, Kvifte and Jensenius (2006)
propose a terminology for describing instruments. They
point out that the level of details differs whether applied to
a listener, a performer, or a constructor (instrument
builder). The features to be analysed include gestural, tech-
nical, and musical parameters, all depending on the level of
speciﬁcity. The paper presents diverse useful models and
mapping charts for analysing instruments, but it was not
meant to be fully comprehensive, and the authors wrote
another paper for the same conference focussing on gestu-
ral descriptions.
At the following year’s conference, Hurtado and I
reported on a survey (Magnusson & Hurtado, 2007) prob-
ing people’s conceptions of acoustic, electric, and digital
instruments as an organological study, but without the aim
of constructing a classiﬁcatory scheme. We were primarily
interested in the language used to describe the difference
between the acoustic and the digital. Also at NIME, in
2010, Garth Paine presented a study towards a taxonomy
of interfaces for electronic music, based upon a survey cre-
ated as part of the TIEM (Taxonomy of Interfaces for Elec-
tronic Music performance) project (Paine, 2010). The
questionnaire had the following sections: (1) general
description, (2) design objectives, (3) physical design, (4)
parameter space, (5) performance practice, (6) classiﬁca-
tion. A wide-reaching engagement with users, asking how
they understand and classify their own instruments, seems
like a promising method for gathering research data from
the ﬁeld, but problems arise when attempting to generate a
coherent system from the disparate data. The author
acknowledges that the approach has weaknesses in this
regard, and that as such it is bound to be incomplete.
Finally, at NIME 2016 in Brisbane, key contributors to
the ﬁeld ran a workshop entitled NIMEhub, focussing on
how to archive instrument designs (McPherson et al.,
2016). The idea was to create a database that would beneﬁt
designers and instrument makers, as knowledge would be
shared between practitioners (equally the successes and the
mistakes), facilitating collaboration, archiving older designs
7Both of these papers should ideally have referenced a very inter-
esting ‘Letter to the Editor’ (of the Computer Music Journal) by
Laurie Spiegel, called ‘An Alternative to a Standard Taxonomy
for Electronic and Computer Instruments’, from 1992. In this
undeservedly little known text, Spiegel introduces a multidimen-
sional parameter space, preceding Birnbaum et al. and mine.
Musical Organics 293
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Su
sse
x L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
7:1
6 0
6 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
for possible reuse, reducing duplication efforts, promoting
easier fabrication, detailed documentation, and supporting
the reproducibility of studies. This is clearly a beneﬁcial
project for the ﬁeld, but the authors acknowledge the prob-
lem of classiﬁcation when creating the database for such a
repository. One such online repository is currently in devel-
opment, MusHack (https://muzhack.com), but here the
focus is on embedded hardware only, currently ignoring
controllers and software instruments.
We have here expounded the problems of organological
classiﬁcations of new DMIs and looked at diverse
approaches in deﬁning the properties through establishing
schemes of critical analytics. These systems are useful on
their own and can be applied as conceptual schemes within
the musical organics system presented below. However,
they cannot be considered exhaustive or comprehensive as
the material nature, gestural sensing, mapping strategies,
synthesis algorithms, aesthetics, and other aspects of digital
instruments, are so multidimensional and complex that tra-
ditional tree-like classiﬁcation schemes do not work as
smoothly as when applied to acoustic instruments. This
article suggests an alternative approach. But before present-
ing the theoretical underpinnings of the musical organics
framework, we would beneﬁt from exploring the history of
classiﬁcation related to musical instruments, and also
engage with more recent notions of non-hierarchical and
dynamic classiﬁcation.
5. On trees, roots, and labyrinths
In her book on concepts and classiﬁcations of musical
instruments, Kartomi (1990) discusses how human beings
seek intellectual security by categorising the world and
dividing it into manageable sections, and she demonstrates
how classiﬁcation systems always depend on the unique
cultural and historical perspective of the classiﬁer. Although
classifying attempts can be found in all cultures, we observe
how the tendency to classify intensiﬁes in the European
Renaissance, particularly with the birth of empirical science.
Burke (2000) illustrates how tree structures became key
metaphors in the sixteenth century, and applied to curricula,
libraries, museums, and encyclopaedias (until they became
alphabetised in the early seventeenth century). The nine-
teenth century saw further tendencies to measure and cate-
gorise, applying scientiﬁc instruments in all domains of
knowledge. The desire was to simplify and understand, to
deﬁne a common framework and language with which to
communicate. Kartomi references anthropologist Lévi-
Strauss who writes ‘Any classiﬁcation is superior to chaos’
(Lévi-Strauss, 1966, p. 15), implying that it is not necessar-
ily the scientiﬁc world view that is of importance but rather
the practical and psychological function it effects. Friedrich
Nietzsche, deeply sceptical of the concept of truth with a
capital T, developed an epistemological approach he called
‘perspectivism’, which rejects objectivity in favour of
Fig. 4. The dimension spaces of Birnbaum et al. (2005) on the left and Magnusson (2010) on the right.
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a multitude of perspectives that form the conditions of truth
and value judgements. Predating twentieth century phe-
nomenological approaches, Nietzsche disapproved of how
the sciences have rejected empirical experience for objective
language and they ‘do this by means of the pale, cool, gray,
conceptual nets which they threw over the colourful confu-
sion of sense, the rabble of the senses’ (Nietzsche, 2004,
Section 14).
Bowker and Star (2000) have argued that classiﬁcation
represents a key issue in the design of computer systems.
In order to represent the state of the world in an informa-
tion system, we perform a process of reduction that
involves deciding which qualities of objects and their rela-
tions we deem relevant to our system (see also Hui, 2016).
Such reduction is inevitably contingent and messy, with an
abundance of ethical and political implications. Natural
objects, artefacts, and human actions are displaced into a
representational schema resulting in strata of complexities
and interdependencies that condition our thinking about the
world. For Bowker and Star a good classiﬁcation system
exhibits the following properties: (1) the classiﬁcatory prin-
ciples are consistent and unique; (2) the categories are
mutually exclusive; and (3) the system should be complete,
and provide a total coverage of the world it describes
(Bowker & Star, 2000, p. 10). These criteria are clearly not
attainable when attempting to classify musical instruments:
is the piano a string instrument or a percussion instrument?
Is the wind harp a wind or string instrument? The wind
chime an aeorophone or an idiophone? The world of musi-
cal instruments is fuzzy and its entropy increases with digi-
tal instruments. Instead of attempting to establish complete
categorical systems of mutually exclusive and consistent
categories, we might rather embrace the chaotic nature of
the world, the fuzziness of concepts, and the ﬂuid continu-
ity that exists between what we often frame as discrete cat-
egorisations and descriptors.
Whence this desire to classify? we might ask, and, as
often before, we trace the development of ideas back to the
early Greek philosophers. For example, we ﬁnd the Isa-
gogue, written by the Neoplatonist Porphyry in the third
century CE, a key work throughout the Middle Ages on
the subject of classiﬁcation and theory of deﬁnition. The
Isagogue is a commentary on Aristotle’s work on ontology,
the Categories from his Organon, where he introduces the
distinction between classes and objects, and proposes ten
classiﬁcatory predicaments of substance, namely: being,
quantity, quality, relation, place, time, posture or attitude,
having or possession, action, and affection.
In his ‘From the Tree to the Labyrinth’, Umberto Eco
(2014) shows how Porphyry is the ﬁrst to project Aris-
totle’s categories in terms of a tree, attributing that concep-
tion to Porphyry’s Neoplatonic worldview. For Eco, the
problem with Porphyry’s interpretation is that he ‘delineates
a single tree of substances, whereas Aristotle uses the
method of division with a great deal of caution and, we
might add, a great deal of skepticism’. (Eco, 2014, p. 6).
Eco, eager to escape the constraints of the tree-metaphor,
points out that Aristotle, in On the Parts of Animals, ‘gives
the impression of being prepared to construct different trees
depending on which problem he is dealing with, even when
it comes to deﬁning the same species’. (Eco, 2014, p. 6).
Eco states that it is Porphyry’s exposition that establishes
the tree-based dictionary-semantics into medieval thought
via Boethius, who translated the Isagogue from Greek to
Latin in the sixth century CE. Boethius happens to be the
author of a ﬁve volume De institutione musica, a key med-
ieval work on music theory, and whose categories of instru-
ments we mentioned in an earlier section of this article (see
Figure 5).
Eco traces medieval learning through analysis of two
distinct organisational knowledge schemes: the dictionary
(semantics) and the encyclopaedia (empirical knowledge).
The tree metaphor is omnipresent, perhaps culminating in
Ramon Lull’s thirteenth–fourteenth century epistemology,
which includes, amongst others, the following tree repre-
sentations: Arbor scientiae (tree of science), Arbor impreia-
lis (tree of government), Arbor moralis (tree of morality),
Fig. 5. Ramon Llull’s Arbor Scientiae, from his work Ars Magna,
from 1295. There is a clear inﬂuence of Aristotle, Porphyry’s Isa-
gogue, and Boethius’s work.
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and Arbor celestialis (tree of astrology and astronomy).
With Francis Bacon’s 1620 Novum Organum (Scientae) we
begin to detect ideas about open repertories, or systems of
knowledge that can dynamically evolve with the use of
improved scientiﬁc instruments. Such encyclopaedic
approach is also to be found in Bacon’s New Atlantis novel
from 1627, which includes a famous speculative organol-
ogy of future musical instruments:
We have also sound-houses, where we practise and demon-
strate all sounds, and their generation. We have harmonies
which you have not, of quarter-sounds, and lesser slides of
sounds. Divers instruments of music likewise to you
unknown, some sweeter than any you have, together with
bells and rings that are dainty and sweet. We represent small
sounds as great and deep; likewise great sounds extenuate and
sharp; we make divers tremblings and warblings of sounds,
which in their original are entire. We represent and imitate all
articulate sounds and letters, and the voices and notes of
beasts and birds. We have certain helps which set to the ear
do further the hearing greatly. We have also divers strange
and artiﬁcial echoes, reﬂecting the voice many times, and as
it were tossing it: and some that give back the voice louder
than it came, some shriller, and some deeper; yea, some ren-
dering the voice differing in the letters or articulate sound
from that they receive. We have also means to convey sounds
in trunks and pipes, in strange lines and distances. (Bacon,
1850, p. 214)
Eco is not interested in musical instruments in his piece;
the focus is on how, in modernity, tree metaphors are
replaced with those of labyrinths or maps. He discusses
Athanasius Kircher’s 54 fundamental categories which were
supposed to be represented by iconograms, but does not
mention Kircher’s work on combinatorics, based on Llull’s
ontology, nor his extensive writing on musical instruments.
Indeed, Kircher is omnipresent in organological literature,
and his work Musurgia Universalis (1650) is one of the
key works of seventeenth century musicology. Here,
Kircher presents the Arca Musarithmica, a machine tech-
nology that makes generative music (as we would call it
today) possible. In a later work, Phonurgia Nova (1673),
Kircher presents musical automata, Aeolian harps, and
transmission of sound over a distance. Similarly, in the
work of Kircher’s pupil, Gaspar Schott, we ﬁnd a related
obsession with musical automata, for example in the work
Mechanica hydraulico-pnevmatica from 1657. Twenty
years later, in Magia universalis naturae et artis, Schott
describes various sonic instruments that both extend the
range of the voice and hearing, as well as outlining tuning
systems based on mathematical calculations (not to mention
the infamous cat piano). However, it is Schott’s taxonomy
of 44 fundamental classes (learned from someone whose
name he says he forgot), which Eco ﬁnds interesting, and
we could list but a few of these:
1. Elements (ﬁre, wind, smoke, ashes, Hell, Purgatory, centre
of the earth). 2. Celestial entities (stars, thunderbolts, the rain-
bows). 3. Intellectual entities (God, Jesus, speech, opinion, sus-
picion, soul, stratagem, or ghost). 4. Secular statuses (emperor,
barons, plebs). 5. Ecclesiastical states. 6. Artiﬁcers (painters,
sailors). 7. Instruments. 8. Affections (love, justice, lust). 9.
Religion .... 14. Brute animals. 15. Birds. 16. Fish and reptiles.
17. Parts of animals. 26. Metals and coins. 27. Various arti-
facts. 28. Stones. 29. Jewels. 30. Trees and fruit. 31. Public
places. 32. Weights and measures. 33. Numerals. 39. Time. 40.
Adjectives, and so on … (Eco, 2014, p. 40)
This is a fantastical collection of classes, perhaps humor-
ous, and certainly becomes so in the poetic exegesis of
Jorge Louis Borges, who, in his essay ‘The Analytical Lan-
guage of John Wilkins’, describes a
certain Chinese encyclopaedia entitled Celestial Empire of
benevolent knowledge wherein it is written that ‘animals are
divided into: (a) belonging to the emperor, (b) embalmed, (c)
tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs,
(h) included in the present classiﬁcation, (i) frenzied, (j) innu-
merable, (k) drawn with a very ﬁne camelhair brush, (l) et
cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from
a long way off look like ﬂies.’ (Borges, 1964, p. 103)
Borges ingenuity and extensive scholarship is well known,
but he is particularly well woven into the argument of this
article with his comments on classiﬁcation, as one of the
key works of his seventeenth century protagonist, the his-
torical Bishop Wilkins, is called ‘An Essay towards a Real
Character and Philosophical Language’ (Wilkins, 1668).
This essay describes the attempt at creating a universal lan-
guage, built on a classiﬁcation scheme based on a family
of symbols akin to Hook’s organography (and note the
word ‘towards’ appearing in the title).
In The Order of Things (French: Les mots et les
choses), Michel Foucault describes his shattering laughter
when he read the above passage in Borges, as the familiar
landmarks of his thought are broken up, by the realisation
that it is impossible to ‘think that’. (Foucault, 1989, p.
xvi). Foucault explains the unease of his laughter: it was
based on the suspicion that there is a more serious level of
disorder than that of the encyclopaedia, ‘I mean the disor-
der in which fragments of a large number of possible
orders glitter separately in the dimension without law or
geometry, of the heteroclite’ (Foucault, 1989, p. xix). In his
work, Foucault demonstrates what he deﬁnes as three dis-
tinct epistemes in recent European history, those of the
Renaissance, Classical and modern periods. It is in the
Classical episteme that we ﬁnd this obsession with order-
ing, with identity and difference, lists and tables, classes,
categorisations and taxonomies. It favours the ‘table, a tab-
ula, that enables thought to operate upon the entities of our
world, to put them in order, to divide them into classes, to
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group them according to names that designate their similar-
ities and their differences—the table upon which, since the
beginning of time, language has intersected space’.
(Foucault, 1989, p. xix)
Foucault points to the disturbing nature of heterotopias,
which many of Borges’ worlds could be described as,
because they break down the linguistic order, they under-
mine language, and dissolve our myths. But the hetero-
topia, those ‘possible orders [that] glitter’ are precisely
what contemporary classiﬁcatory solutions are moving
towards, clearly inﬂuenced by the role of network theory in
both the physical and social sciences (Castells, 1996), and
perhaps particularly by the non-hierarchical structure of the
brain as a function of its neural net structure. Already in
1945, computer scientist Warren McCulloch wrote a piece
on the heterarchy of the brain’s topology (McCulloch,
1945), inspiring further work in cybernetics, network the-
ory, and distributed intelligent systems. In the practical
example of working cybernetic feedback systems, where
outputs become input parameters, we clearly see how the
tree structure breaks (see Figure 6).
We are discerning a move from tree-based hierarchies
to root-based heterarchies—from symbolic to cybernetic
control. Eco applies the metaphors of labyrinths, which will
replace the dictionary and encyclopaedic models of tradi-
tional classiﬁcation schemes, naming three speciﬁcally: the
unicursal labyrinth (with only one possible path); the Irr-
weg labyrinth, with diverse alternative choices; and the net-
work, where each point can be connected with another.
(Eco, 2014, p. 52). For Eco, the network is a solution to
the ‘vertigo’ one is faced with when realising that knowl-
edge can never be systematically organised (as opposed to
Foucault’s Renaissance and Classical epistemes), and we
conclude with a labyrinth which is not ‘ordered by clear
binary disjunctions’ (Eco, 2014, p. 36). Here, Eco pulls in
Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the rhizome, deﬁned
thusly by the pair:
unlike trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to
any other point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits
of the same nature; it brings into play very different regimes
of signs, and even nonsign states. [...] It is composed not of
units but of dimensions, or rather directions in motion. It has
neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) from
which it grows and which it overspills. [...] Unlike the tree,
the rhizome is not the object of reproduction: neither external
reproduction as image-tree nor internal reproduction as tree-
structure. The rhizome is an antigenealogy. It is a short-term
memory, or antimemory. The rhizome operates by variation,
expansion, conquest, capture, offshoots. [...] In contrast to cen-
tered (even polycentric) systems with hierarchical modes of
communication and preestablished paths, the rhizome is an
acentered, nonhierarchical, nonsignifying system without a
General and without an organizing memory or central automa-
ton, deﬁned solely by a circulation of states. (Deleuze &
Guattari, 1987, p. 21)
How would a rhizomatic organological framework of
instrument analysis work? How should it be encoded? Who
would encode it? Using which classiﬁers and systems? A
heterarchical database of musical instruments with ‘multiple
entryways’ and ‘in constant modiﬁcation’ would need to be
digital, stored in modern database models, and one that is
called into form by the user’s request. Like the rhizome,
musical organics ‘pertains to a map that must be produced,
constructed, a map that is always detachable, connectable,
reversible, modiﬁable, and has multiple entryways and exits
and its own ﬂight’. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 21) The
next section will investigate the possibilities of such a
system.
6. Towards musical organics
It has emerged that tree-like classiﬁcations are not fully
coherent and functional for traditional instruments, and it is
clear that in the analysis of digital instruments they break
completely. A new approach is required that supports
probes (searches or queries) into repositories of digital
instruments from a multiplicity of perspectives: materials
(e.g. plastic, metal, glass, ﬁbre, cloth); sensors (e.g. ultra-
sound, CMOS, bend, potentiometers); sound (e.g. physical
models, FM, additive, concatenative, granular, sampling);
mapping (e.g. one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-one, con-
vergent, learned, evolutionary, stochastic); gestures (e.g.
wave, hit, stroke, pluck, shake, strike, bow, blow); reuse of
proprioceptive skills (such as the trained playing of key-
board, strings, wind and percussion); manufacturer (e.g. of
sensors, chips, motors), and many more, including cultural
context, musical style, and other areas that have been, or
indeed will be, called for as extensions to the existing
Fig. 6. A change of metaphors: in place of a tree, with branches
extending out from a common trunk, we now ﬁnd a rhizomatic
root, lacking a centre.
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organological classiﬁcations. This system would build on
earlier descriptive organologies, but support interpretive
organologies that ask ‘why and how’ questions, offer
explanations, and put the queries into historical and musi-
cological contexts (Heyde, 2001) (See ﬁgures 7 and 8).
To classify is ﬁrst to decide what we deem as relevant
to our current interests and then ‘cast the conceptual net’ of
Nietzsche. This is the area of ontology, described by Aris-
totle in his Metaphysics as the discipline that studies being
as being, and the attributes that necessarily belong to being
(Book IV, chapter 1). Ontology has a long history, but it is
primarily a philosophical study of entities, their functions
and relations. Computer scientists, in their attempt to tran-
scribe and represent the physical world and digital objects
(Hui, 2016), have come up with their own ontologies of
representations that are of key importance in software engi-
neering. For Eco, the computer science approach to ontol-
ogy has been disappointingly tree-like, but deﬁned by a
prominent computer scientist as ‘a speciﬁcation of a repre-
sentational vocabulary for a shared domain of discourse—
deﬁnitions of classes, relations, functions, and other
objects’ (Gruber quoted in Eco, 2014, p. 60). What Eco
ﬁnds useful in the computer science approach to ontology
is that here the intention is not to be complete, but simply
to cover the domain it is designed to represent. ‘In this
sense, an ontology, however clumsy and ingenuous it may
be, is the local representation of a portion of encyclopaedic
knowledge relevant for the purposes of a given universe of
discourse’. (Eco, 2014, p. 61).
The approach proposed here under the name of musical
organics is not a new classiﬁcation system, but a heterar-
chical method of analysing, archiving and representing
instruments. This is a methodology of looking: of re-
searching, investigating, probing; of comparing and recon-
textualising; of explaining transitions and transductions in
the evolution and design of musical instruments. Musical
organics is a rhizomatic system (the ‘organics’ connotation
is indeed appropriate),8 that is to be implemented primarily
as an information retrieval search system with an open API
(application programming interface), clear protocols, and
small set of open standards. This means that anyone can
design a front-end interface for it, whether they are com-
mon database representations, GPU accelerated graphical
libraries in JavaScript, or new virtual reality presentation
technologies. The API would enable a plug-in structure, so
that people could write ‘probes’ (a query, a search, a
Nietzschean perspective) into the database. For example,
none of the existing classiﬁcations contain an ontological
category or ﬁeld for the number of players required to play
an instrument. Here, we might ﬁnd that only one person
can play the jaw harp, minimum two are required for the
txalaparta, the piano can be played by many performers
(e.g. Rachmaninoff’s piece Romance for 6 hands), and a
digital system might have multiple performer interfaces for
the same instrument. The number-of-players ﬁeld might be
interesting to some researchers yet of no interest to others,
and this requires the musical organics system to be ﬂuid
and ﬂexible in design, respecting Deleuze and Guattari’s
suggestion that such a system ‘is open and connectable in
all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible
to constant modiﬁcation’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987,
p. 10).
What is produced by a probe into the musical organics
system would be a presentation of objects, relations, quali-
ties, quantities, metaphors, imaginaries, all serving the
unique query that is asked. These presentations are not
built by hand, but pulled out of the online data mines for
representation in diverse visualisation clients. With today’s
potential for information retrieval, machine learning and
new database technologies, we can analyse, compare, con-
nect and synthesise data in larger spatial domains and at
faster speeds than ever conceivable before, often signiﬁ-
cantly outperforming human experts. We are effectively
able to create a hyper-dimensional dynamic organism in the
form of an interconnected growing repository that will not
only contain descriptions of the instruments’ properties, but
also pictures, sounds, 3D models, videos of the instruments
in performance, and more. This allows for very personal
uses of the system. Having worked on a ‘search’ that
produces a classiﬁcation, the user would be able to save
that constellation as a plugin to the system, which
could be studied and improved upon by other users (see
Figure 7).
Such a knowledge representation system would be
based upon what DeLanda (2002), in his work on Deleuze,
calls a ‘ﬂat ontology’, deﬁning it in the following terms:
‘…while an ontology based on relations between general
Fig. 7. The halldorophone. An example of how twenty-ﬁrst cen-
tury instruments contain the elements of the acoustic, the elec-
tronic, and the digital in one and the same device.
8The name also derives from Adolph Bernhard Marx’s section on
organology in his Allgemeine Musiklehre, from 1839, where the
third part, on musical instruments, is called ‘Organik’, but trans-
lated in the English version, published in 1853, as ‘Musical
Organics’. This was long before the term ‘organology’ began to
be used for the study of musical instruments.
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types and particular instances is hierarchical, each level
representing a different ontological category (organism,
species, genera), an approach in terms of interacting parts
and emergent wholes leads to a ﬂat ontology, one made
exclusively of unique, singular individuals, differing in spa-
tio-temporal scale but not in ontological status’. (DeLanda,
2002, p. 47). This type of ontology would be problematic
in traditional classiﬁcation schemes, but less so in systems
using databases that can be probed by search queries result-
ing in dynamic, machine-generated constellations of presen-
tation. In order to describe these digital instruments, their
objectivity and their semiotic relations to other digital
objects, we might resolve to what Harman and Bogost call
‘ontography’, which is a ‘general inscriptive strategy… that
uncovers the repletedness of units and their interobjectivity’
or ‘an aesthetic set theory, in which a particular conﬁgura-
tion is celebrated merely on the basis of its existence’
(Bogost, 2012, p. 38). Both Bogost and Harman are
inspired by what they call ‘Latour litanies’, or a ‘group of
items loosely joined not by logic or power or use but by
the gentle knot of the comma’, constructed to create the ﬂat
ontology that rejects hierarchies of objects. For Bogost, the
practice of ontography involves describing the processes of
accounting for objects and their relations. Ontographic
writing is cataloguing, pointing to ‘the couplings and
chasms’ between things (Bogost, 2012, p. 50). Such
ontographies can be machine generated and classiﬁed, ren-
dered into interpretative frameworks for human researchers.
Indeed, the machines can prepare the data, but to interpret
and understand it, we still need human organologists with
their hermeneutic skills (see Figure 8).
A musical organics system would be a three-tiered sys-
tem that incorporates traditional specialist classiﬁcations,
user contributions (or ‘folksonomy’), but importantly also
going beyond trees and metadata to actual machine analysis
of content, where the system can ‘excavate’ properties,
such as textual descriptions, music information retrieval
timbral similarities of the instruments, or image and video
materials. This could be represented in many different pre-
sentational schemes, for example, using 2 or 3D visualisa-
tion, or soniﬁcation. What is at stake is what Wolfgang
Ernst deﬁnes as an informatised organisation of knowledge,
one which ‘generates diagrams, which, incidentally, is also
Deleuze’s term for the Foucauldean new archive’. (Ernst,
2015, p. 10). What Ernst is pointing to here is that new
machine information retrieval technologies offer a study of
large data structures that are not based on human tagging
of metadata or classiﬁcation:
What is being digitally ‘excavated’ by the computer is a num-
ber of information patterns which human perception perceives
as ‘text’, ‘sound’ or ‘images’. Contrary to traditional semantic
research hermeneutics, an active, audio-visual, coded archive
will no longer list text, sound and image sequences according
to their authors, subjects, and metadata only. Instead, algorith-
mically driven digital data networks will allow verbo-audio-
visual sequences to be systematized according to genuinely
signal-parametric notions (mediatic rather than narrative topoi),
revealing new insights into their informative qualities and
operative aesthetics. (Ernst, 2015, p. 10)
The primary reason for suggesting that in a musical organ-
ics system there is a clear separation between the data
stored, how it is parsed, and how it is (re)presented; is that
the data does not change, but our methods of probing into
the database will beneﬁt from new information retrieval
techniques, and new systems of data representation, for
example, with new augmented or virtual reality technolo-
gies including haptics. This representation of data through
graphical form is something Johanna Drucker has written
extensively about in her work on graphesis (Drucker,
2014), which is a study of the visual production of knowl-
edge. The projects Drucker and colleagues have been
developing at SpecLab (Speculative Computing Laboratory)
at UCLA have been practical investigations into the digital
humanities and in particular projects of information repre-
sentation (Drucker, 2009). In ‘Performative Materiality’
Drucker discusses interpretative interfaces as dynamic sys-
tems that can pull data into views in order to support acts
of interpretation, that are generative and iterative, capable
of producing new knowledge, as opposed to returning
selected results from a pre-existing data-set. Drucker
advises that we
shift from the univocal to polyvocal, introduce point of view
systems within the interface so that all views are from the
position of an observer, not assumed to be independent, auton-
omous. Create fragmented and correlated points of view that
resist self-evident reiﬁcation. Create environments that are con-
stellationary, so that diagrammatic relations can be used to
re-order familiar conventions through acts of generative,
performative engagement. (Drucker, 2013).
Fig. 8. The Karlax controller. A new instrument with 55 individ-
ual parameter controls. New instruments are now going beyond
their acoustic counterparts, reusing skills (ﬁnger control of keys),
but applying other gestural inputs, such as an accelerometer for
detecting movement, rotation sensor for twist, etc.
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The SpecLab projects are in many ways similar in spirit to
the work of another experimental laboratory in the humani-
ties and digital studies, the Pompidou’s Institute for
Research and Innovation (IRI—see www.iri.centrepompi
dou.fr), lead by Bernard Stiegler and Vincent Puig. In Puig
(2014), some of the IRI projects are described, most of
them involving a practical element (a truly practice-based
philosophical approach), for example exploring the bottom-
up creation of metadata to understand complex data struc-
tures, or what Puig calls folksonomy (as opposed to the
top-down taxonomy). Stiegler has engaged with the techno-
logical perspective embedded in cybernetics and sees tech-
nology itself as an epiphylogenetic condition of the human
—an essential part of human nature (Stiegler, 1998). For
Stiegler, the tendency to categorise and create classes con-
stitutes a rationality that underpins human language, and
continuing Derrida’s grammotology, he calls the process of
transducing or transcribing objects or events from the ana-
logue domain into the discrete domain grammatisation.
Interestingly, in his recent work Stiegler also applies the
term organology, but with the preﬁx ‘general’,9 aimed at
signifying how technologies become extended organs,
instruments for performance and thought, as well as social
activities:
the thinking of grammatization calls for a general organology,
that is, a theory of the articulation of bodily organs (brain,
hand, eyes, touch, tongue, genital organs, viscera, neuro-vege-
tative system, etc.), artiﬁcial organs (tools, instruments and
technical supports of grammatization) and social organs (hu-
man groupings … social systems in general). (Stiegler, 2010,
p. 34)
If the musical organics classiﬁcation approach is dynamic,
open and ﬂexible, it could indeed engage with the three
levels of Stiegler’s general organology, where organologists
would incorporate the study of bodily organs in music
making, in particular learning, proprioception, kinaesthetic,
collaboration, skills, virtuosity. They would clearly also
study artiﬁcial organs, our prosthetic musical organs, the
technologies through which we express music, the instru-
ments. This is what traditional organology has focussed on,
but this new organology would include broader technologi-
cal contexts such as phonographic, notational, and ergo-
nomic technologies. Finally, musical organics would
include social organs: the modes through which we collab-
orate, communicate, share and enjoy music—the way we
musick (Small, 1998) in the broad sense.
7. Conclusion
This article has presented musical organics as a method-
ological approach for studying and classifying instruments,
including DMIs (which are the primary cause of the current
classiﬁcatory problems). It has articulated the problems
with taxonomic, top-down, tree-like classiﬁcation of musi-
cal instruments in favour of a dynamic system of rearrange-
able data. Musical organics is not a deﬁned classiﬁcation
system, an implementation, or a technical speciﬁcation of
musical instrument data: it is a philosophical attempt to
rethink classiﬁcatory strategies and provide a theoretical
underpinning for actual practical work. Musical organics
explores and frames the ecosystems of musical technics as
a reticulated web—one that hybridises older organologies,
continually borrowing, referencing, appropriating, and rep-
resenting the techniques incorporated in human technologi-
cal production and performative movement. This is a
heterarchical organology, referencing the soil, plants, ﬂow-
ers, and clearly the rhizome itself.
Although a concrete design awaits future work, the musi-
cal organics approach would suggest a threefold structure:
(1) The search domains (online search engines, aggrega-
tors, article repositories, collections, and databases)
where data repositories can be registered as part of
the search.
(2) The open search-API of data models. The API will
support semantic web standards and common inter-
operable standards and protocols for online reposito-
ries (e.g. OAIS—Open Archival Information System,
and SWORD—Simple Web-service Offering Reposi-
tory Deposit), applying information retrieval tech-
niques and machine learning, feeding probes that are
returned in commonly used data interchange formats
(such as JSON or XML). Users would be able to
contribute their own ontological categories, or meta-
tagging in a folksonomy style, as well as plugins of
new critical analytics schemes.
(3) The representational engines that display (textually,
visually, sonically) the search results. These change
over time, applying new developments in aesthetics
and media technologies, especially in terms of infor-
mation display.
The aim of this article has not been to provide the tech-
nical speciﬁcation of this system, but rather to discuss the
philosophical underpinning of its design in a historical con-
text. However, it is worth reasoning about why it is impor-
tant to split the system up into these three parts, namely in
order to make it future-proof, as the individual technologi-
cal elements of the system (i.e. data, search, and representa-
tion) change over time and should be able to evolve
independently. This can be achieved if the communication
protocols between the three parts of the system are well
deﬁned.
9Stiegler is well aware of the musicological meaning of the term
organology, having served as the director of IRCAM (Institut de
Recherche et Coordination Acoustique/Musique) in Paris, between
2002 and 2006.
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Although musical organics might add a novel analytical
instrument to the ﬁeld of organology, it is not a new way
of thinking. Indeed, we can trace the roots of heterarchical
information organisation to Bush, 1945 article in The
Atlantic Monthly called ‘As We May Think’, where an
information machine, called Memex, is described that
enables the user to access all the world’s literature, personal
exchange, and multimedia data via one device. Personalis-
ing research, the user ‘builds a trail of his [sic] interests
through the maze of materials available to him [sic]’.
(Bush, 1945). The dynamic and networked method of rela-
tional thinking, incorporated in the notion of musical
organics, is well supported by machine technologies and
has a long history in computer science and AI.
This article has surveyed some historical organological
classiﬁcations. The musical organics system proposed here
is not intended to be comprehensive, ﬁnal or exhaustive,
but one that might evolve, fork out and re-branch, with
modular packages that can be applied and added, akin to
software plugins, synthesiser modules, or code libraries. A
machine information retrieval supported search and classiﬁ-
cation mechanism is never going to do the job ‘on its
own’; the need for hermeneutics, of human interpretation
and understanding of context will always be required. The
computational system is only there to do the hard labour.
Furthermore, older classiﬁcation systems are not to be
abandoned, as many of the existing systems contain inge-
nious solutions and perspectives on what is relevant in
instrument design, but none of them have proven sufﬁcient
on their own for the analysis of digital instruments. In
order to establish a platform that can support diverse
approaches to organological analysis, to support tradition,
share knowledge, and build a repertoire, the proposed sys-
tem needs to be dynamic, open source, distributed and col-
laborative. This article has attempted to describe a system
of critical analytics for musical instruments, arguing that
we are at the right time for information retrieval to become
part of our extended organs of research, adding AI to our
intellectual instruments for organological investigation.
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